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DOES LACK OF AN INSURABLE INTEREST PRECLUDE
AN INSURANCE AGENT FROM TAKING AN ABSOLUTE
ASSIGNMENT OF HIS CLIENT'S LIFE POLICY?
Johnny C. Parker*
I. INTRODUCTION
To understand any concept it helps to know the purposes it
serves and the objectives it seeks to achieve. The maxim that
one "must have an insurable interest in the life or property
insured" has haunted insurance law for centuries.1 This doc-
trine conditions both the validity and enforceability of insurance
contracts upon the existence of an insurable interest in the
person who purchases the policy.2 The considerations which
* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa School of Law; B-A, 1982, University of
Mississippi; J.D., 1984, University of Mississippi School of Law; LL.M., 1987, Colum-
bia University School of Law.
1. The origins of the insurable interest doctrine can be traced to a 1746 Act of
Parliament which declared:
[No assurance or assurances shall be made by any person or persons,
bodies corporate or politic, on any ship, or ships belonging to his majesty,
or any of his subjects, or on any goods, merchandise, or effects, laden or
to be laden on board of any such ship or ships, interest or no interest,
or without further proof of interest than the policy, or by way of gaming
or wagering, or without benefit of salvage to the insurer, and that every
such assurance shall be null and void to all intent and purposes ....
19 Geo. 2, ch. 37, 511 (1746).
Three decades later, another Act of Parliament "for regulating insurance upon
lives, and for prohibiting all such insurances, except in cases where the person insur-
ing shall have an interest in the life or death of the person insured" was enacted. 14
Geo. 3, ch. 48, 398 (1774).
Early English courts interpreting the Statute of George H made significant
contributions to the development of the insurable interest doctrine. See LeCras v.
Hughes, 99 Eng. Rep. 549 (KB. 1782) (interpreting the type of interest necessary to
satisfy the insurable interest requirement); Lucena v. Craufurd, 127 Eng. Rep. 630
(H.L. 1805), on app. 127 Eng. Rep. 858 (H.L. 1808) (suggesting at least three distinct
tests for determining whether an insurable interest exists: (1) a factual expectation
test; (2) a legal or equitable interest test; and (3) an intermediate test.).
Early American courts adopted the insurable interest doctrine without modifi-
cation or change. See, e.g., Ruse v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins., 23 N.Y. 516 (1861);
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457 (1876).
2. Legal scholars have been plagued by the problem of articulating an all-encom-
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underlie the insurable interest requirement are generally ex-
pressed in terms of public policy: (1) against allowing wagering
contracts; (2) against fostering temptation to destroy the in-
sured property or life in an effort to profit from it; and (3)
favoring limitations upon the sweep of indemnity contracts.'
These considerations also serve the interest of the insurer in
several ways. First, they eliminate the risk of moral hazard by
conditioning the validity and enforceability of the contract upon
the existence of a valid interest in the subject matter of the
policy. Second, they legitimate the desire of the insurer to pro-
vide insurance only for the benefit of individuals who have an
interest in the subject of the contract, thus lessening the likeli-
hood of adverse selection. The force of these policy objectives is
reflected in the rule that only the insurer may raise lack of an
insurable interest as a defense.4
passing concise definition of the term "insurance." Nevertheless, a contract of insur-
ance is an agreement by which one party, for a consideration, promises to pay money
or its equivalent, or to do an act valuable to the insured upon the destruction, loss,
or injury of something in which the other party has an interest.
"Insurable interest defines a minimum kind of connection which the purchaser
of insurance must have with the subject of the risk in order for the transaction to be
valid. Thus, it is a threshold requirement. If it is there, the insurance contract is
valid; if not, invalid." Banks McDowell, Insurable Interest In Property Revisited, 17
CAP. U. L. REV. 165, 171 (1988). See also, 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 218 (1993); 3
GEORGE COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 24:1 (Rev. ed. 1995).
3. See EDWIN W. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 110-11, 156-58 (2d
ed. 1957); Bertram Harnett & John V. Thornton, Insurable Interest In Property: A
Socio-Economic Reevaluation of a Legal Concept, 48 COLUm. L. REV. 1162 (1948);
William T. Vukowich, Insurable Interest: When It Must Exist In Property And Life
Insurance, 7 WIILAME"TE L. REV. 1 (1971).
4. See Toler v. Baldwin County Say. & Loan Ass'n, 239 So.2d 751 (Ala. 1970);
Gristy v. Hudgens, 203 P. 569 (Ariz. 1922); Mullenax v. National Reserve Life Ins.,
485 P.2d 137 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Whitaker v. Ranow, 327 S.E.2d 855 (Ga. Ct. App.
1985); Matthews v. Matthews, 186 P.2d 233 (Kan. 1947); Secor v. Pioneer Foundry
Co., 173 N.W.2d 780 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969); Poland v. Estate of Fisher, 329 S.W.2d
768 (Mo. 1959); Feely v. Lacy, 322 P.2d 1104 (Mont. 1958); Ryan v. Tickle, 316
N.W.2d 580 (Neb. 1982); Girdner v. Girdner, 337 P.2d 741 (Okla. 1959); Trent v.
Parker, 591 S.W.2d 769 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979); Commonwealth Ins. v. Lacy, 214
S.W.2d 899 (Tex. App. 1948); see also 3 GEORGE COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D §
24:6, at 22 (Rev. ed. 1995); 2 JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW
& PRACTICE § 765, at 130 (West 1966) (1941); WmIAM R. VANCE, VANCE ON INSUR-
ANCE § 31, at 199 (3d ed. 1951).
For a discussion of the continued validity of this rule in the context of life
insurance see infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
INSURABLE INTEREST
A. Property and Life Insurance Contracts
In the United States the insurable interest requirement be-
gan as a judicially imposed doctrine.5 Decisional law, however,
has given way to statutory law in a significant number of juris-
dictions. Consequently, insurable interest is universally defined
in a manner that reflects the aforementioned policy objectives
as they pertain to specific types of insurance contracts. For
example, the goal of property insurance is to indemnify the
insured for loss suffered as a result of the impairment of an
interest in the subject of the contract. If the insured lacks an
insurable interest in the property, she cannot suffer the type of
loss necessary to invoke the principle of indemnification.6 Con-
sequently, in the context of property insurance, insurable inter-
est is uniformly defined as "any actual, lawful, and substantial
economic interest in the safety or preservation of the subject of
the insurance free from loss, destruction, or pecuniary damage
or impairment."7 This definition reflects the principle of indem-
5. See supra note 1.
6. [Ilnsurance is aimed at reimbursement, but not more. The principle
that insurance contracts shall be interpreted and enforced consis-
tently with this objective of conferring a benefit no greater in value
than the loss suffered will be referred to in this book as the prin-
ciple of indemnification. This principle does not imply, in converse,
that the benefit must be less than loss. That is, partial reimburse-
ment of a loss is not offensive to the principle of indemnity ...
Any opportunity for net gain to an insured through the receipt of
insurance proceeds is inconsistent with the principle of indemnity.
ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIc TEXT ON INSURANCE LAw 88 (1971).
7. See ALA. CODE § 27-14-4 (1986); ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.030 (Michie 1993);
ARZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1105 (1990); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-104 (Michie.1992); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2706 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.405 (West 1996); GA. CODE
ANN. § 33-24-4 (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10E-101 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 41-1806
(1991 & Supp. 1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-060 (Michie 1996); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 22:614 (West 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2406 (West 1990); MD.
CODE ANN., INS. § 12-301 (1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-15-205 (1995); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 687B.060 (Michie 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-18-6 (Michie 1995);
N.Y. INS. LAW § 3401 (Consol. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-29-04 (1995); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 36, § 3605 (1990 & Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-10-8 (Michie
1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-104(2)(b) (1994 & Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. §
38.2-303 (Michie 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.18.040 (West 1984 & Supp.
1997); W. VA. CODE § 33-6-3 (1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-15-104 (Michie 1991); P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 26, § 1105 (1976).
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nification by limiting the insurer's indemnification duty to the
extent of the insured's interest in the property.'
In contrast, life insurance is viewed as an investment con-
tract.9 This view is based upon the proposition that the amount
of the policy is rarely tied to a measurable loss. Rather, life
insurance is a contract in which the insurer, for a certain sum
of money or premium proportioned to the age, health, livelihood
and other circumstances of the person whose life is insured,
engages that if such person shall die within the policy period
the insurer shall pay the sum specified in the policy, according
to the terms thereof, to the person in whose favor the policy is
granted. Furthermore, life insurance, unlike its property
counterpart, provides protection against an occurrence that is
certain to occur. In property insurance there is no such certain-
ty, only a possibility that the insured risk will result in loss.
Every individual has an unlimited insurable interest in his or
her own life, health and bodily safety and may take out a poli-
cy of insurance on his or her own life, health or safety. Insur-
able interest, in this context, is further defined to include an
individual's interest in others as follows: (1) in the case of indi-
viduals related by blood or by law, a substantial interest engen-
dered by love and affection; and .(2) in the case of other per-
sons, a lawful and substantial economic interest in having the
life, health, or bodily safety of the insured individual continued,
as distinguished from an interest in value by the death, disabil-
ity, or injury of the insured individual.'
8. See supra notes 6 & 7. In this respect the insurable interest requirement acts
as a measure of damages. See McDowell, supra note 2, at 175-78.
9. Life and property insurance do share similarities. Each type of insurance has
characteristics of both indemnity and investment. See ROBERT E. KEETON, BASic IN-
SURANCE LAW 107-08 (1960); PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 154-56; GEORGE RICHARDS,
LAW OF INSURANCE § 24, at 27-28 (3d ed. 1925); see also ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN
I. wmiss, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FuNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES,
AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 3.1(e), at 141 (student ed. 1988).
10. See ALA. CODE § 27-14-3(a) (1996); ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.020(d) (Michie 1993);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1104(C) (1990); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-103(cX1) (Michie 1992
& Supp. 1995); CAL. INS. CODE § 10110 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 18, § 2704(c)(1)-(2) (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-3(a) (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. §
431:10-202(a)(1)-(2) (1993); IDAHO CODE § 41-1804(3)(a)-(b) (1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 304.14-040(4Xa)-(b) (Michie 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:613(C)(1)-(2) (West 1995
& Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2404(3)(A)-(B) (West 1990); MD.
CODE ANN., INS. § 12-201(bX2)-(3) (1995); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 83-5-251 (Supp. 1996);
[Vol. 31:71
1997] INSURABLE INTEREST
The issue of whether an insurable interest exists is not deter-
mined in a vacuum. Rather, this question represents only half
of an intensely policy oriented equation. The other half of the
equation is represented by the question, "when must the insur-
able interest exist: at the time of loss, time of claim, or incep-
tion of the policy?"
The theoretical distinctions between property and life insur-
ance have been instrumental in the development of the respons-
es to the latter question. In the context of property insurance it
is universally agreed that an insurable interest must exist at
the time the loss occurred.1' This view is consistent with both
the principle of indemnity and the prohibition against wagering
contracts. A majority of jurisdictions require an insurable inter-
est to exist at the time of loss, as well as at the time the con-
tract is purchased.' In the context of life insurance, however,
it is universally agreed that the interest need exist only at the
time of the inception of the policy." Consequently, the insur-
MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-15-201 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 687B.0403(a)-(b)
(Michie 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-18-4 (C)(1)-(2) (Michie 1995); N.Y. INS. LAW §
3205(a)(1)(A)-(B) (Consol. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-29-09.1(3)(a)-(b) (1995); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 36, § 3604(C)(1)-(2) (1990 & Supp. 1997); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 512
(West 1992 & Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-4-27(C)(1)-(2) (Michie 1994); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 58-10-4 (Michie 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-104(2)(a) (1994 &
Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.18.030 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); W. VA.
CODE § 33-6-2(C)(1)-(2) (1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-15-102(C)(i)-(ii) (Michie 1991 &
Supp. 1996).
11. See 4 JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §
2122, at 31 (Rev. ed. 1969). This view has been severely criticized. See 44 C.J.S. In-
surance § 220 (1993); KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 9, § 3.3(b)(2), at 153-54. For a
detailed discussion of this issue, see Vukowich, supra note 3.
12. See supra note 11.
13. See ALA. CODE § 27-14-3(e) (1996); ALASKA STAT. § 21.40.020(a) (Michie 1993);
ARiz. REv. STAT. § 20.1104(A) (1990); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-103(a) (Michie 1992 &
Supp. 1995); CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1(d) (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 18, § 2704(a) (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-3(d) (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. §
431:10-204(b) (1993); IDAHO CODE § 41-1804(1) (1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-12-
17.1(e) (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-453(a) (1993); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 22:613(A) (West 1995); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2404(1) (West
1996); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 12-201(a)(2)(iii) (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.531(6)
(West Cure. Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3604(A) (1990 & Supp. 1997); Crabb
v. Calvert Fire Ins., 255 S.W.2d 990 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953); Siegrist v. Schmoltz, 6 A.
47 (Pa. 1886); Cheeves v. Anders, 28 S.W. 274 (Tex. 1894). See also Ryan v.
Andrewski, 242 P.2d 448 (Okla. 1952):
[A life insurance policy] is not a mere contract of indemnity but it is a
contract to pay to beneficiary a certain sum in event of death of the
insured, [and] where [an] insurable interest exists when the policy is
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able interest rules are primarily concerned with the initial
issuance of a life policy and less with subsequent events.'4
A majority of jurisdictions statutorily recognize the right of
any individual of competent legal capacity to procure an insur-
ance contract upon his own life for the benefit of anyone.
However, no person may procure an insurance contract upon
the life of another individual unless the benefits under the poli-
cy are payable to the insured, his personal representative, or a
person having, at the time the contract is made, an insurable
interest in the life of the individual insured. 6
Legislatures throughout the country have also codified the
common-law rule which prohibits the making of a life insurance
contract upon the life of another unless the insured applies for
the policy or consents thereto in writing.'7 The sole exception
issued and a valid contract of insurance is then effected, it is not defeat-
ed by a cessation of the insurable interest unless the terms of the policy
so provide.
Id. at 452. See also 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 977 (1982); 44 C.J.S. Insurance §§
220, 235 (1993).
14. For example, one court observed that:
[T]he almost universal rule of law in this country is that if the
insurable interest requirement is satisfied at the time the policy is is-
sued, the proceeds of the policy must be paid upon the death of the life
insured without regard to whether the beneficiary has an insurable inter-
est at the time of death.
In re Al Zuni Trading Inc., 947 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Secor v.
Pioneer Foundry Co., 173 N.W.2d 780, 782 (Mich. 1970)).
15. See ALA. CODE § 27-14-3(b) (1996); ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.020(a)-(b) (Michie
1993); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-1104(A)-(B) (West 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-
103(a) (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1995); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2704(a)-(b) (1989);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10-204(a)-(c) (1993); IDAHO CODE § 41-1804(1)-(2) (1991); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 40-450(a),(c) (1993 & Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:613 (A)-(B)
(West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2404(1)-(2) (West 1990); MD. CODE
ANN., INS. § 12-201(a)(1) (ii)-(iii), (d) (1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-5-251(1)-(2) (Supp.
1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-15-201(1)-(2) (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-704(1) (1993
& Supp. 1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 687B.040(1) (Michie 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
17B:24-1.1(a)(1) (West 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-18-4(A)-(B) (Michie 1995); N.Y.
INS. LAw § 3205(b)(1)-(3) (Consol. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-29-09.1(1)-(2) (1995);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3604(A)-(B) (1990 & Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. §
743.024(1),(2) (1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 512 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 27-4-27(a)-(b) (Michie 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAwS § 58-10-3 (Michie
1996); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.49-1(1) (West 1981 & Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 31A-21-104 (1994 & Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-301A (Michie 1994);
WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.030(1)-(2) (1984 & Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE § 33-6-2(a)-(b)
(1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-15-102(a)-(b) (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1996).
16. See supra note 15.
17. See ALA. CODE. § 27-14-6(a) (1996); ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.090 (Michie 1993);
INSURABLE INTEREST
to this prohibition is where the policy is being contracted for by
a person having an insurable interest in the insured.18 When
someone other than a person having an insurable interest pro-
cures a policy on the life of another without his consent or
knowledge, courts have traditionally relied upon two theories to
render the policy unenforceable: (1) the policy is a wagering
contract, or; (2) such a policy presents an opportunity for
crime.'
The argument that the insurable interest rules are primarily
concerned with the issuance phase of the process is further
supported by statutes which recognize that:
[i]f the beneficiary, assignee, or other payee under any con-
tract in violation ... [of the prohibition against procuring
insurance on the life of an individual when the benefits are
not payable to the individual insured, his personal repre-
sentative, or an individual with an individual insurable
interest] receives from the insurer any benefits thereunder
accruing upon the death, disablement or injury of the indi-
vidual insured, the individual insured or his executor or
administrator, as the case may be, may maintain an action
to recover the benefits from the person so receiving them."
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1107 (West 1990); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-105 (Michie
1992 & Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-6(a)(1)-(4) (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. §
431:10-206(1)-(2) (1993); IDAHO CODE § 41-1808(1)-(3) (1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22:616 (1)-(2) (West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2408(l)(A)-(C) (West
1990); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 12-202(2)(ii)(b)(1)-(3) (1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-5-
253 (1995); Mo. REV. STAT. § 376.531(1)-(2) (1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-15-401(1)-
(3) (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-704(1) (1993 & Supp. 1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
687B.080 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-18-8(A)-(C) (Michie
1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3607(1)-(2) (1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.027(1)-(4) (1995);
S.D. CODIFIED LAwS § 58-10-6(1)-(3) (Michie 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-302 (Michie
1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.18.060 (West 1984); W. VA. CODE § 33-6-5 (1996);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-15-106 (Michie 1995); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 26, § 1107(a)-(b)
(1995); see also Jackson Nat Life Ins. v. Receconi, 827 P.2d 118 (N.M. 1992);
BERTRAm HARNETr & IRVING I. LEsNicK, THE LAw OF LIFE & HEALTH INSURANCE §
3.04(1)(a) (1991) (citing 28 jurisdictions with statutes to this effect).
18. See supra note 17.
19. See generally 29 AML JUn. Insurance §§ 231, 433-34 (1960); 3 GEORGE COUCH,
COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 24:118 (2d ed. 1960).
20. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-103(b) (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1995); see supra note
15; see also, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-104(5) (1994 & Supp. 1996), which pro-
vides:
An insurance policy is not invalid because the policyholder lacks insur-
able interest or because consent has not been given, but a court with
appropriate jurisdiction may order the proceeds to be paid to some per-
1997]
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While statutes of this nature recognize that life policies so
procured violate public policy, they further the needs of society
and the ends of justice in two significant respects. First, these
statutes create a limited exception to the common-law rule that
only the insurer may assert lack of an insurable interest as a
defense. This exception applies only where the insurer has
waived his right to assert the defense by paying the proceeds to
the beneficiary/assignee, and where the life insurance contract
was procured in violation of public policy. Second, this exception
allows the complaining party to recover the proceeds from the
receiving party-a much more effective remedy than merely
voiding the policy.2 This exception, much like the rule, is in-
son who is equitably entitled to them, other than the one to whom the
policy is designated to be payable, or it may create a constructive trust
in the proceeds or a part of them on behalf of such a person, subject to
all valid terms and conditions of the policy other than those relating to
insurable interest or consent.
21. The policy objectives for requiring an insurable interest in life insurance pol-
icies are to prevent the use of insurance as a wagering contract and to discourage
crime. These objectives are not fully achieved when only the insurer can raise the
defense of lack of insurable interest because the rule does not penalize the insurer
for failing to inquire into the existence of an insurable interest at the application
phase. Rather, it allows insurers to sit on their hands and assert the defense for
their own benefit once the issue is raised following the death of the insured.
The rule only discourages beneficiaries who lack an insurable interest from pro-
curing a life policy; it does not have the effect of discouraging insurance companies
from negligently issuing policies in contravention of public policy. Consequently, an
individual who procures an insurance policy on the life of another in whom she lacks
an insurable interest may be encouraged by the even odds that the insurer may not
raise the defense and pay the proceeds.
It should be noted however, that several jurisdictions have added bite to the
rule by recognizing tort actions against insurers who issue policies to individuals who
lack insurable interests in the named insured. See Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. v. Weldon,
100 So.2d 696 (Ala. 1957); Burton v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins., 298 S.E.2d 575
(Ga. 1982) (holding an insurer not liable unless issuance of policy to individual with-
out an insurable interest increased risk of harm and is prohibited by statute); Ramey
v. Carolina Life Ins., 135 S.E.2d 362 (S.C. 1964); Bacon v. Federal Kemper Life As-
surance, 512 N.E.2d 941, 941 (Mass. 1987) ("[t]he only duty the law imposes on an
insurer to protect its [insured] is that the company take reasonable steps to deter-
mine whether the insured has consented to the policy or the change of beneficiary").
See also Comment, Tort Liability of Insurance Company-Rules of Insurable Interest
and Consent, 17 S.C. L. REV. 454 (1965); Annotation, Tort Liability of Insurer Issuing
Life Policy Without Consent of Insured or To Beneficiary Without Insurable Interest, 9
A.L.R. 3D 1172 (1966).
There are no decisions allowing the estate of the insured to recover on the
policy from the insurer which has negligently issued a policy. The rationale for not
INSURABLE INTEREST
tended to discourage individuals from procuring insurance con-
tracts on lives in which they lack insurable interests, and does
not discourage insurance companies from unknowingly issuing
policies in contravention of public policy.22 This is due to the
fact that the exception arises only in those instances where the
insurer has decided to pay the proceeds of the policy, rather
than asserting the defense of a lack of insurable interest. Thus,
the insurer, in such a case, loses nothing more than that which
it has already consented to pay. Likewise, the insurable interest
doctrine does not impose upon insurers any obligation for which
they are legally accountable.' Therefore, in the absence of an
insurable interest, the insurer may choose to void the policy ab
initio and retain the death benefits from both the insured's
estate or representative and the named beneficiary.
The public policy against using life insurance policies as
contracts of wager is so deeply ingrained into the fabric of in-
surance law that some courts have expressed a willingness to
ignore the rule that one has an unlimited insurable interest in
one's own life. Ordinarily this occurs when the policy, though
procured or consented to by the insured, is taken out pursuant
to a scheme to circumvent the law against wagering contracts.
Thus, despite the fact that the insured procured the policy, it
may still be unenforceable in the absence of good faith, or in
the presence of fraud, collusion, or an intent to enter into a
contract of wager.'
allowing the estate to recover from the insurer is that the policy was void ab initio
when it is shown that the beneficiary lacked an insurable interest at the time the
policy was procured. See Mutual Life Ins. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 (1886); New
England Mut. Life Ins. v. Null, 605 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1979); Colyer v. New York
Life Ins., 188 S.W.2d 313 (Ky. 1945); Aetna Life Ins. v. Strauch, 67 P.2d 452 (Okla.
1937).
22. See supra note 21.
23. See supra note 21.
24. See Bankers' Reserve Life Co. v. Matthews, 39 F.2d 528 (8th. Cir. 1930);
Penn Mut. Life Ins. v. Slade, 47 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Ky. 1942); Quinton v. Millican,
26 S.E.2d 435 (Ga. 1943); Clements v. Terrell, 145 S.E. 78 (Ga. 1928); Hoffman v.
Federal Reserve Life Ins., 255 P. 980 (Kan. 1927); Davis v. Gulf States Ins., 151 So.
167 (Miss. 1933); Deal v. Hainley, 116 S.W. 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1909); Guardian Nat'l
Life Ins. v. Eddens, 13 N.W.2d 418 (Neb. 1944); Pierce v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 187
N.E. 77 (Ohio 1933); Elmore v. Life Ins., 198 S.E. 5 (S.C. 1938); Roberts v. Nation
Benefit Life Ins., 148 S.E. 179 (S.C. 1929).
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B. The Problem
In 1969, Beauty Craft Tile of the Southwest, Inc. purchased
life insurance policies on the lives of its "key" people and paid
the premiums. Each policy provided for $100,000 in death bene-
fits. The soliciting insurance agent, in the sale of these policies,
was Frank Berry. In 1985, Beauty Craft was sold to a Califor-
nia company. Beauty Craft, in contemplation of the sale, decid-
ed to assign to all "key" persons the life policies it had procured
in 1969. Each insured, following the assignment, was responsi-
ble for paying the premiums due on their respective policy.
Among the "key" employees receiving a life insurance policy
was the company accountant, Jerry Johnson. Mr. Johnson des-
ignated his wife, Mary, as primary beneficiary in the policy.
In late 1992, Mr. Johnson was diagnosed with metastic liver
cancer and underwent surgery. Thereafter, he was treated with
chemotherapy. In early 1994, Mr. Johnson received notice that
a $1,652 premium plus $1,914.55 interest on a policy loan was
due on the policy. This amount, $3,566.55, was reduced by
$2,949.16 in current year premium loan, for a minimum pay-
ment due of $617.39. Mr. Johnson, following receipt of the no-
tice, contacted Mr. Berry and informed him that he wanted to
surrender the life policy that had been taken out on his life
and assigned to him by Beauty Craft. Mr. Johnson's decision to
surrender the policy was the result of illness-induced financial
circumstances which impaired his ability to pay the premiums.
Concerned, Mr. Berry informed Mr. Johnson that the amount
stated in the notice might not necessarily be the amount re-
quired to keep the policy-in effect another year. Mr. Berry con-
tacted the insurance company and allegedly informed Mr. John-
son that a significantly lesser amount would keep the policy in
effect. Mr. Berry also told Mr. Johnson that there would be tax
consequences as a result of the surrender of the policy. Howev-
er, it is disputed whether Mr. Johnson actually understood that
$81.00 would have continued the policy for an additional year.
This amount, following the absolute assignment,' was ulti-
25. "An absolute assignment of a life insurance policy is the irrevocable transfer
by the policyowner of all of the policyowner's rights in the policy. Ordinarily, an
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mately paid by Frank Berry from a loan on the policy.
Thereafter, the facts leading up to the assignment of Mr.
Johnson's life policy to Mr. Berry are in dispute. However, it is
clear that on February 3, 1994, Jerry Johnson executed an
absolute assignment of his life policy to Frank Berry, the sell-
ing and servicing agent on the policy. The assignment was
pursuant to the assignment provision of the policy. Mr. Johnson
sold the policy to Mr. Berry for $3,000. At the time of the as-
signment the death benefit payable on the policy was $100,000,
less approximately $23,000, which resulted from a loan taken
out on the policy by Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson would have re-
ceived approximately $2,900 had he surrendered the policy.
Prior to February 3, the day of the execution of the absolute
assignment, Mr. Berry consulted an attorney about the legality
of the proposed transaction between him and Mr. Johnson.
Pursuant to the attorney's advice, Mr. Berry prepared an agree-
ment-between-parties contract. This document, which was
signed by both parties and executed simultaneously with the
absolute assignment, provided that Mr. Berry had: (1) explained
all options available to Mr. Johnson, including the absolute
assignment; (2) explained the premium payments and amount
due; (3) encouraged Mr. Johnson to consult with and offer the
policy to family members; and (4) offered to give Mr. Johnson
the money necessary to keep the policy in force for another
year. Both the absolute assignment form and the agreement-
between-parties contract were witnessed and notarized by a
manager of the insurance company for which Mr. Berry
worked. By late 1994, Mr. Johnson's medical condition had
worsened to the point that he was reduced to taking morphine
to ease the pain. In late December 1994, he gave Leslie Price,
his step-daughter, his power of attorney, which expired on his
death. At this time, Mrs. Johnson had severe Parkinson's
disease.
In January of 1995, Leslie Price, seeking return of the policy,
filed a complaint with the State Insurance Commission concern-
absolute assignment is made in order to give the policy away or to sell it." MURIEL
L. CRAWFORD & WILLIAM T. BEADLES, LAw AND THE LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACT 356
(6th ed. 1989). Absolute assignments are also sometimes used to secure a loan. See
id. at 360.
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ing the assignment of 'the policy to Mr. Berry. The Insurance
Commission concluded that a question of fact and law was at
issue and only a court with adequate jurisdiction could resolve
the matter. Mr. Johnson died on April 20, 1995. He was preced-
ed in death by the agent Mr. Berry, who died April 7, 1995.
The estates of both the assignor and assignee made claims to
the death benefits, but only the estate of Jerry Johnson filed an
action against the insurance company. This complaint asserted,
among other causes, a claim for improper assignment against
the insurance company. This allegation was based upon the
insurance company's acceptance of the assignment pursuant to
the policy terms. Mr. Johnson's estate also asserted that the
insurance company was liable for Mr. Berry's breach of the
fiduciary obligation of good faith and fair dealing in the assign-
ment transaction.
Among the disputed facts were: (1) whether Mr. Berry ever
informed Mr. Johnson of the insurance company's accelerated
benefit rider;26 (2) whether Mr. Berry had a duty to inform
Mr. Johnson of the existence of viatical settlement companies,
collateral assignments, or other alternatives to an absolute
assignment; and (3) whether Mr. Berry had offered to loan Mr.
Johnson the money necessary to keep the policy in force for
another year.
Following Mr. Berry's death, the insurance company, aware
of the conflicting claims to the proceeds, filed a motion and
brief for entitlement to interpleader and for discharge. The
estate of Mr. Johnson filed an objection to the discharge of the
insurance company. The court, noting that a party seeking
interpleader must be free from blame in causing the controver-
sy, granted the request for interpleader but denied the insur-
ance company's prayer for discharge.27
26. This rider would have entitled Mr. Johnson to receive at least 75% of the
face value of the policy if he were terminally ill and medically qualified. "Medically
qualified" was defined in the accelerated benefit riders as terminally ill with a prog-
nosis of death within twelve (12) months.
27. The facts of this problem were derived from a case in which I was retained
as an expert witness for the insurance company. The insurance company, which did
nothing other than accept the assignment according to the terms established in its
policy, was extremely embarrassed by the action filed. Consequently, I have purposely
refrained from using the company's name in the problem. The names of the litigants
have also been changed.
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This article will examine the insurable interest requirement
in the limited context of life insurance. Specifically, it examines
two issues of first impression. First, it explores whether the
insurable interest doctrine precludes insurance agents from
taking assignments of the life policies of their clients in whom
they lack insurable interests. Thereafter, it addresses the ques-
tion of whether insurance companies should be held legally ac-
countable for such conduct on the part of their agents.
Part I examined the development of the insurable interest
doctrine. It defined the contours of the doctrine by articulating
the purpose it serves and the objective it intends to achieve.
Subsection A discussed the development, rationale and applica-
tion of the requirement in the context of property and life in-
surance contracts. Subsection B provided a factual context from
which to examine the primary thesis. These facts were taken
from a filed action, which was ultimately settled, involving the
propriety of a life insurance agent taking assignment of an
insured's life policy.
Part II discusses the validity of assignments to individuals
who lack insurable interests in the lives of insureds. Subsection
A examines the decisional law with regards to this issue. Sub-
section B discusses the legislative response to this issue. Sub-
section C discusses the validity and judicial construction of dis-
claimers of liability for determining the validity of assignment
provisions.
Part IH examines the thesis from the perspective of agency
law. Subsections A and B discuss the common-law definitions
and distinctions between "general insurance agents," "solicitors"
and "insurance brokers." Subsection C explores statutory defini-
tions and distinctions. This subsection also addresses how
courts view statutes defining the terms "general insurance
agent," "solicitor" and "insurance broker." Subsection D discuss-
es the unique concept of dual agency. Subsection E integrates
the agency concept of "fiduciary duty" into the primary thesis.
This subsection examines various theories, other than agency
law principles, that might support recognition of a fiduciary
relationship between insurance agents and insureds in an abso-
lute assignment transaction.
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Part IV discusses the law of bad faith litigation in the con-
text of the problem. This section ultimately concludes that the
problems inherent in assignment transactions are not a part of
the claims-making process with which bad-faith is concerned.
Part V concludes that policy considerations disfavor assign-
ments to insurance agents who lack insurable interests in the
lives insured.
II. VALIDITY OF ASSIGNMENTS TO INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT
INSURABLE INTEREST
A. Case Law
St. John v. American Mutual Life Insurance Co." is one of
the earliest American opinions which addresses the issue of the
legality of an assignment of a life policy to an individual who
lacked an insurable interest in the insured. The insured execut-
ed to the plaintiff two life policies having combined death bene-
fits of $4,000 for: (1) a consideration of $300; (2) continued
payment of premiums by plaintiff; and (3) a promise to pay
insured's wife $1,500 upon insured's death. Judge Crippin,
writing for the court, observed that an absolute sale, assign-
ment, and transfer of a life policy, valid at its inception, to one
having no insurable interest, was valid and entitled the assign-
ee to the proceeds of the policy upon the death of the in-
sured. 9 This holding was clearly influenced by the fact that
the defendant's policy provided for assignments and notice
thereof, as well as the existence of good faith in the execution
of the assignment.0 Of equal significance was the fact "that
without the right to assign, insurances on lives lose half their
usefulness."3'
The rationale articulated in St. John significantly influenced
the development of what has become known as the majority
view on the subject. 2 According to this view, an assignment of
28. 13 N.Y. 31 (1855).
29. See id. at 40.
30. See id. at 39-41.
31. Id. at 39.
32. The majority of early common-law courts and legal scholars rejected the logic
offered for requiring insurable interests for assignees, but did not reject beneficiaries
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a life policy by the insured or beneficiary to an individual who
lacks an insurable interest in the life of the insured is not void
per se and will be upheld if the assignment was made in good
faith and not merely intended to evade the law against wager-
ing contracts.3
Two rationales have been advanced in favor of the majority
rule that an assignment of a life policy to a person lacking an
and discarded assignment restrictions as meaningless formalities. See KEETON &
WIDISS, supra note 9, § 3.5(d), at 186.
Alabama, Kansas, Kentucky, Texas and Virginia initially adhered to what is
commonly referred to as the minority view. According to this view, the assignment of
a life policy by the insured or the beneficiary to one lacking an insurable interest is
void as a matter of law.
A number of rationales have been advanced for this view. For example, there is
no distinction between the assignment of a policy to a person without an insurable
interest, and the procurement of a policy by such a person in the first instance. Like-
wise, it has been suggested that such contracts constitute a wagering contract. Final-
ly, it has been stated that an assignment to a person who lacks an insurable interest
in the life of the insured affords the temptation to commit murder. See, e.g.,
Helmetag v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183 (1884); Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Elison, 83 P. 410
(Kan. 1905); Bayse v. Adams, 81 Ky. 368 (1883); Price v. Supreme Lodge, 4 S.W. 633
(Tex. 1887); Roller v. Moore, 10 S.E. 241 (Va. 1889).
The above jurisdictions have repudiated the minority view and currently adhere
to the majority rule. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-14-21(a)-(b) (1986); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 304.14-250(1) (Michie 1996); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.49-1(2) (West 1981 &
Supp. 1997).
33. See Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911); Watson v. Massachusetts Mut.
Life Ins., 140 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 746 (1944); Robinson
v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 28 F.Supp. 244 (N.D. Okla. 1939), modified on reh'g on other
grounds, 31 F. Supp. 350 (1940); Brown v. New York Life Ins., 22 F.Supp. 82
(W.D.S.C.), rev'd on other grounds, 99 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S.
638 (1939); Matlock v. Bledsoe, 90 S.W. 848 (Ark. 1905); Curtiss v. Aetna Life Ins.,
27 P. 211 (Cal. 1891); Lewis v. Reed, 192 P. 335 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920); Sheets v.
Sheets, 36 P. 310 (Colo. Ct. App. 1894); Bowen v. National Life As'n, 27 A. 1059
(Conn. 1893); Bray v. Malcolm, 22 S.E.2d 126 (Ga. 1942); Wohlberg v. Merchants
Reserve Life Ins., 209 Ill. App. 176 (1917); Elliot v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 64 N.E.2d
911 (Ind. App. 1946); Anderson v. Aetna Life Ins., 188 N.W. 883 (Iowa 1922); Aetna
Life Ins. v. Kimball, 112 A. 708 (Me. 1921); First Nat'l Bank v. Liberty Trust Co.,
134 A. 210 (Md. 1926); Potvin v. Prudential Ins., 114 N.E. 292 (Mass. 1916); Pruden-
tial Ins. v. Liersch, 81 N.W. 258 (Mich. 1899); Peel v. Reibel, 286 N.W. 345 (Minn.
1939); Grant v. Independent Order of Sons & Daughters of Jacob, 52 So. 698 (Miss.
1910); Butterworth v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 240 S.W.2d 676 (Mo. 1951);
Chamberlain v. Butler, 86 N.W. 481 (Neb. 1901); Prudential Ins. v. Corriveau, 168 A.
569 (N.H. 1933); Givens v. Veeder 50 P. 316 (N.M. 1897); Thompson v. Pilot Life
Ins., 67 S.E.2d 444 (N.C. 1951); Hardy v. Aetna Life Ins., 67 S.E. 767 (N.C. 1910);
Keckley v. Coshocton Glass Co., 99 N.E. 299 (Ohio. 1912); Lyman v. Jacobsen, 275 P.
612 (Or. 1929); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. v. Tucker, 61 A. 142 (RI. 1905); Hammers
v. Prudential Life Ins., 216 S.W.2d 703 (Tenn. 1948); Harrison v. Northwestern Mut.
Life Ins., 63 A. 321 (Vt. 1906); Opitz v. Karel, 95 N.W. 948 (Wis. 1903).
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insurable interest in the life of the insured, if not tainted, is
valid. The first is commercial in nature and grounded in the
capitalistic philosophy which dominated the country's young
industrial economy at the turn of the twentieth century. Accord-
ing to this rationale, life insurance policies are investment
contracts of great commercial value. Consequently, the law
should not restrict the free transferability thereof by limiting
the class of purchasers to those having an insurable interest in
the life of the insured. To do otherwise would impair the value
and utility of the policy as an article of property and prevent
the free sale of policies on the open market at the most advan-
tageous terms.
The second rationale is purely legal in nature. It is premised
upon the notion that a life insurance contract is a chose in
action and should therefore be assignable absolutely or by way
of security as with any other chose. 5 Thus, it was observed by
Judge Crippen in St. John that:
I am not aware of any principle of law that distinguishes
contracts of insurance upon lives, from other ordinary con-
tracts, or that takes them out of the operation of the same
legal rules which are applied to and govern such contracts.
Policies of insurance are choses in actions; they are gov-
erned by the same principles applicable to other agreements
involving pecuniary obligations.36
As noted earlier, the view that an assignment of a life policy
to an individual lacking an insurable interest in the life of the
insured is not void as a matter of law does not necessarily
mean that all such assignments are per se valid. Rather, this
34. See, e.g., Grisby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911); Bowen v. National Life Ass'n,
27 A. 1059 (Conn. 1893); Hawley v. Aetna Life Ins., 125 N.E. 707 (Ill. 1919); Mutual
Life Ins. v. Allen, 138 Mass. 24 (1884); Rahders v. People's Bank, 130 N.W. 16
(Minn. 1911); Murphy v. Red, 1 So. 761 (Miss. 1887); St. John v. American Mut. Life
Ins., 13 N.Y. 31 (1855); Clark v. Allen, 11 R.I. 439 (1877).
35. See, e.g., Page v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 135 S.W. 911 (Ark. 1911); Sheets v.
Sheets, 36 P. 310 (Colo. Ct. App. 1894); Fitzgerald v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins.,
13 A. 673 (Conn. 1888); Steele v. Gatlin, 42 S.E. 253 (Ga. 1902); U.S. Life Ins. v.
Ludwig, 103 IMI. 305 (1882); Farmers' & Traders' Bank v. Johnson, 91 N.W. 1074
(Iowa 1902); Stuart v. Sutcliffe, 14 So. 912 (La. 1894); Fitzgerald v. Rawlings Imple-
ment Co., 79 A. 915 (Md. 1911); Peel v. Reibel, 286 N.W. 345 (Minn. 1939); Murphy
v. Red, 1 So. 761 (Miss. 1887); Chamberlain v. Butler, 86 N.W. 481 (Neb. 1901).
36. St. John, 13 N.Y. at 39.
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rule creates a prima facie case in favor of the validity of the
assignment. The presumption in favor of validity is conditioned
upon the transaction having been in good faith and the absence
of an intent to circumvent the law with regards to wagering
contracts.37 Consequently, assignments tainted with either of
these defects are treated as void ab initio.35 Thus, in instances
where a person lacking an insurable interest procures a policy
on the life of another without consent, or where an insured
makes an invalid assignment to an individual similarly situat-
ed, the insurable interest doctrine penalizes the parties by
voiding the contract.
The standard for determining whether the presumption of
validity has been successfully rebutted is the "intentions of the
parties" test. 9 Pursuant to this standard, courts examine a
number of factors in the quest to determine whether the assign-
ment was a subterfuge for a wagering contract.' However, no
37. See, e.g., Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911); Finnie v. Walker, .257 F.
698 (2nd Cir. 1919); Lawrence v. Travelers' Ins., 6 F.Supp. 428 (D. Pa. 1934); Volun-
teer State Life Ins. v. Buchannan, 73 S.E. 602 (Ga. Ct. App. 1912); Oleskar v. Kotur,
48 N.E.2d 88 (Ind. App. 1943); Fitzgerald v. Rawlings Implement Co., 79 A. 915 (Md.
1911); Bowers v. Missouri Mut. Ass'n, 62 S.W.2d 1058 (Mo. 1933); Stein v.
Diepenbrock, 52 N.E. 662 (N.Y. 1899).
38. See supra note 37.
39. See supra note 37.
40. No one factor alone is determinative of the issue of the validity of the assign-
ment. Specific factors which are used to determine the parties intentions include:
(1) The policy is taken out by the insured for the purpose of assignment. This
factor counsels against the validity of the assignments. However, courts have accorded
this factor alone varying degrees of weight. See, e.g., Homes Life Ins. v. Masterson,
21 S.W.2d 414 (Ark. 1929); Quillian v. Johnson, 49 S.E. 801 (Ga. 1905); Cisna v.
Sheibley, 88 Ill. App. 385 (1900); Bromley v. Washington Life Ins., 92 S.W. 17 (Ky.
1906); Tripp v. Jordan, 164 S.W. 158 (Mo. Ct. App. 1914); Brett v. Warnick, 75 P.
1061 (Or. 1904).
(2) The length of time between the issuance of the policy and its assignment.
The opinions addressing this factor do not express a generally agreed-upon length of
time between issuance and assignment. Consequently, the cases do not reflect a con-
sistent pattern. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins., 13 A. 673 (Conn.
1888); Rylander v. Allen, 53 S.E. 1032 (Ga. 1906); Oleska v. Kotur, 48 N.E.2d 88
(Ind. App. 1943); Mutual Life Ins. v. Allen, 138 Mass. 24 (1884).
(3) Payment of premiums by the insured rather than the assignee. This factor
favors the validity of the assignment. See, e.g., Amick v. Butler, 12 N.E. 518 (Ind.
1887); King v. Cram, 69 N.E. 1049 (Mass. 1904); Harrison v. Northwestern Mut. Life
Ins., 63 A. 321 (Vt. 1906).
(4) The adequacy of the consideration for the assignment. See, e.g., Bankers'
Reserve Life Co. v. Matthews, 39 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1930); Bray v. Malcolm, 22
S.E.2d 126 (Ga. 1942); Hawley v. Aetna Life Ins., 125 N.E. 707 (Ill. 1919); Aetna Life
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single factor alone has been identified as controlling on the
issue. Each factor must be considered in combination with the
underlying facts and circumstances of the case.4'
B. Legislative Response
Many jurisdictions have enacted statutes addressing the as-
signability of life insurance policies.' The majority of these
statutes are virtually identical in language and provide that a
policy may be assignable or nonassignable as provided by its
terms.'
Statutes of this nature continue the prima facie rule of valid-
ity in favor of assignments that result from and comply with
policy terms and procedures. Therefore, the validity of assign-
ments to third parties who lack an insurable interest in the life
of the insured remains a viable legal issue to which the com-
mon-law analysis remains applicable.
Some state statutes however, contain clear and concise lan-
guage on this point which eliminates all doubt regarding this
issue." For example, the North Dakota assignment statute
Ins. v. Kimball, 112 A. 708 (Me. 1921); Lee v. Equitable Life Ass'n, 189 S.W. 1185
(Mo. Ct. App. 1916); Chamberlain v. Butler, 86 N.W. 481 (Neb. 1901); St. John v.
American Mut. Life Ins., 13 N.Y. 31 (1855); Johnson v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins., 72
S.E. 847 (N.C. 1911).
(5) The absence of statutory restrictions. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. v. Liersch, 81
N.W. 258 (Mich. 1899); Keckley v. Coshocton Glass Co., 99 N.E. 299 (Ohio 1912).
(6) The existence of a policy provision regarding assignment. See, e.g., Matlock
v. Bledsoe 90 S.W. 848 (Ark. 1905); Rylander v. Allen, 53 S.E. 1032 (Ga. 1906); King
v. Cram, 69 N.E. 1049 (Mass. 1904); St. John v. American Mut. Life Ins., 13 N.Y. 31
(1855).
For a detailed discussion of the factors see 30 A.L.R. 2D 1310 (1953).
41. See supra note 37.
42. See ALA. CODE § 27-14-21 (1986); ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.270 (Michie 1993);
ARI. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1122 (West 1990); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-124 (Michie
1992); CAL. INS. CODE § 10130 (West 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2720 (1989);
GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-17 (1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10-228 (1995); IDAHO CODE
§ 41-1826 (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-250 (1) (Michie 1996); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2420 (West 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-15-414 (1995); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 26.1-33-33 (1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3624 (1990 & Supp. 1997); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 512 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFKED LAWS § 58-10-6.1
(Michie 1996); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.49-1(2) (West 1981 & Supp. 1997); VA.
CODE ANN. § 38.2-3111 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
48.18.360 (West 1984).
43. See supra note 42.
44. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-14-21(b) (1986), which provides:
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provides that: "[a] life insurance policy may pass by transfer,
will, or succession to any person, whether that person has an
insurable interest or not .... ." The statutory law of Califor-
nia. goes further and treats an assignment to third persons
lacking an insurable interest as per se valid.'
Neither the decisional nor statutory law in the majority of
jurisdictions expressly prohibits the assignment of a life policy
to an insurance agent who lacks an insurable interest in the
life of his client. This should not, however, be construed to
mean that all such assignments are presumed valid. Nor does
the common-law analysis, with its emphasis on good faith and
absence of an intent to circumvent policy, provide an appropri-
ate basis for resolving the issue. This is due to the fact that
new policy issues arise from an assignment to an insurance
agent. For example, in appropriate circumstances the in-
sured-agent relationship may be construed to impose upon an
agent a minimum obligation to inform the insured of all the
alternatives to absolute assignment offered by his insurance
company. The agent's obligation may also include the duty to
refrain from self-dealing or situations that create an appearance
of impropriety or conflict of interest."
A policy of life insurance, taken out by the insured himself or by a per-
son having an insurable interest in the life of the insured, in good faith
may, unless the policy provides otherwise, be assigned to anyone as any
other chose in action without regard to whether the assignee has an
insurable interest in the life insured or not.
South Dakota law provides that "[i]f a policy of life insurance has been issued in
conformity with this section, no transfer of the policy or any interest thereunder shall
be invalid by reason of a lack of insurable interest of the transferee in the life of the
insured... ." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-10-6.1 (1995). Virginia law provides:
No life insurance policy shall be taken out by the insured or by a person
having an insurable interest in the insured's life for the mere purpose of
assignment. A policy may be assigned whether or not the assignee has
an insurable interest in the life insured unless the policy provides other-
wise.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3111 (Michie 1994).
45. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33-33 (1995).
46. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10130 (West 1993) (stating "[a] life or disability policy
may pass by transfer, will or succession to any person, whether or not the transferee
has an insurable interest .. . ').
This statute has been construed to mean that assignments are valid, notwith-
standing contrary provisions of policy. See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 111 P.2d 322 (Cal.
1941); Lewis v. Reed, 192 P. 335 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920).
47. See infra Part mIA-E (providing a detailed discussion of fiduciary obligations).
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Two jurisdictions, which statutorily recognize an insured's
right to assign a life policy, have legislatively resolved the spe-
cific issue of whether an insurance agent can take an assign-
ment of a life policy of an insured when the agent lacks an
insurable interest. These jurisdictions, Oklahoma and Flori-
da,49 prohibit the assignment of a policy to an agent who lacks
an insurable interest in the life of the insured. The legislative
history of these statutes does not reveal a specific legislative
intent or purpose; however, the statutory language clearly ex-
presses a public policy orientation that disfavors the practice."
The Oklahoma and Florida statutes, however, fail to identify
the party or parties liable for violation of the prohibition con-
tained therein and the measure of damages applicable thereto.
Nevertheless, in light of the prohibitive nature of the insurable
interest doctrine, the culpable party in all likelihood is the
agent rather than the insurance company. Under this scenario,
the measure of damages is limited to the proceeds of the policy.
This measure provides the complaining party with the benefit
of the insured's bargain and prevents the unjust enrichment of
the wrongdoer. The logic underlying this approach is consistent
with four basic and widely shared propositions: (1) insurers are
entitled to rely upon statements, declarations, and representa-
tions made by applicants for insurance relative to the insurable
interest of the applicant in the insured and incur no liability by
virtue of untrue statements, declarations, or representations
relied upon in good faith;51 (2) payment, without notice of an
48. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 1425(m) (1990 & Supp. 1997). This statute was
effective March 2, 1995 and provides: "It shall be unlawful for any insurance agent to
receive an ownership interest in any policy, by assignment or otherwise, unless the
agent has an insurable interest in the life of the insured."
49. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.798 (West 1996) which provides:
No life agent shall, with respect to the placement of life insurance cover-
age with a life insurer covering the life of a person who is not a family
member of the agent, handle in his capacity as a life agent the place-
ment of such coverage when the agent placing the coverage receives a
commission therefor and is the named beneficiary under the life policy,
unless the life agent has an insurable interest in the life of such person.
This statute expressly prohibits the life agent from becoming a beneficiary under a
policy in which he lacks an insurable interest in the life of the insured. The spirit of
this statute, however, is consistent with the view that life agents may not take as-
signments of policies in which they lack an insurable interest in the lives insured.
50. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 1425(M) (1990 & Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
626.798 (West 1996).
51. A number of jurisdictions statutorily provide that:
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inconsistent claim, discharges the insurer;2 (3) insurance com-
panies ordinarily are not obligated to inquire into the details of
an assignment transaction;53 and (4) the insurable interest doc-
trine does not impose upon insurance companies an obligation
for which they are legally accountable.' These propositions,
considered together, are also significant in that they reflect a
legislative and judicial reluctance to impose upon insurance
companies an additional obligation (i.e., duty to inquire into the
merits of every assignment) that would certainly add to the ex-
pense of administering life insurance contracts and the cost of
life policies. This remedy is also consistent with the limited
exception to the rule that only the insurer can assert lack of an
insurable interest as a defense.5" A different rule should apply
where an insurer pays the policy proceeds to the agent/assignee
with knowledge of an inconsistent claim to the proceeds. In this
limited instance, the insurance company is the culpable party
and may be required to pay the policy proceeds to the com-
An insurer shall be entitled to rely upon all statements, declarations, and
representations made by an applicant for insurance relative to the insur-
able interest that the applicant has in the insured, and no insurer shall
incur liability, except as set forth in the policy, by virtue of any untrue
statements, declarations, or representations, so relied upon in good faith
by the insurer.
Jurisdictions which have statutes to this effect include: CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.2
(West 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2704(d) (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.404(1)
(West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-6(c) (1996); IDAHO CODE § 41-1804(4) (1991 &
Supp. 1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-040(5) (Michie 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24-A(4), § 2404 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-5-251(4) (Supp.
1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:24-1.1(d) (West 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-18-4(E)
(Michie 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.024(3) (1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-4-27(e)
(Michie 1994); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-15-102(d) (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1996).
52. See ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.280 (Michie 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2721
(1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.423 (West 1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10-230 (1993);
IDAHO CODE § 41-1828 (1991); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-260 (Michie 1996); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:643 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A,
§ 2425 (West 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-15-501 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
687B.210 (Michie 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:24-5 (West 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
59A-18-26 (Michie 1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3626 (1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.041
(1989 & Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3712 (1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-321
(Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.18.370 (West 1984); W. VA.
CODE § 33-6-22 (1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-15-123 (Michie 1991). Assignment stat-
utes also recognize that payment, without notice of inconsistent claims, discharges the
insurer. See supra note 42.
53. See discussion infra Part H.C.
54. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 15 & 20 and accompanying text.
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plaining party despite the fact that it has already paid the
agent/assignee.
The rationale favoring assignments of life policies to third
persons who lack insurable interests in the lives insured is at
least as great as the considerations underlying the development
of the insurable interest doctrine. Consequently, from a policy
perspective, the relevant question is whether the objectives of
both concepts can coexist in the limited confines of the life
insurance contract. The law has struck a delicate balance
wherein harmony is achieved by predicating the validity of as-
signments of this nature upon the existence of good faith and
absence of an intent to circumvent the policies underlying the
insurable interest doctrine. Several states have attempted to
balance these objectives by prohibiting the assignment of life
insurance policies that violated the insurable interest require-
ment at the inception of the contract.56 Nevertheless, the bet-
ter view seems to be that the validity of assignments to life
agents, who lack insurable interests in the lives of their in-
sured, should be determined on a case-by-case basis.
C. Assignment Provisions in the Policy
An insurance contract governs the rights of the parties and
their liabilities to each other. Therefore, the insurer and in-
sured may agree that the policy may or may not be assigned
and such a provision is valid.5' Likewise, an insurance compa-
ny may lawfully provide that its policies can be assigned only
on such terms as are provided therein, and if such terms are
not complied with the assignment is invalid as against the
company.58 Statutes which predicate the validity of assign-
ments upon the terms of the policy also customarily provide
words to the effect that:
56. See IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-3-8 (Michie 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:35-11
(West 1994).
57. See Immel v. Travelers Ins., 26 N.E.2d 114 (IMl. 1940); Mueller v.
Northwestern Univ., 63 N.E. 110 (I. 1902); see also CRAWFORD & BEADLES, supra
note 25, at 361, 366.
58. See 31 C.J.S. Insurance § 430 (1923); 2 ROGER W. COOLEY, COOLEY'S BRIEFS




Any... assignment shall entitle the insurer to deal with
the assignee as the owner ... of the policy in accordance
with the terms of the policy, until the insurer has received
at its home office written notice of the termination of the
assignment ... or written notice by, or on behalf of, some
other person claiming some interest in the policy in conflict
with the assignment.59
Pursuant to statutory language of this nature and a policy
provision providing for an assignment, an insurance company's
obligation ends upon payment of the proceeds to the assignee
prior to notice of an inconsistent claim.60
Assignment provisions also commonly provide that in no
event will the insurer be responsible for its validity. This lan-
guage is for the benefit of insurance companies. Its practical
effect is to minimize the insurance company's role in the as-
signment process. In essence, this language clearly expresses
the insurer's position that it is not obligated to actively approve
or disapprove of any particular assignment or, in the absence of
notice of a defect, inquire into the transaction. Rather, the
insurer has a passive responsibility to merely accept assign-
ments upon the conditions expressed in the policy.6' Therefore,
where an insurer in good faith makes a payment to an assignee
without knowledge of an inconsistent claim or other defect in
the assignment, the insurer is discharged from liability to sub-
sequent claimants.62
III. AGENCY AND THE FmucIARY OBLIGATION ARGUMENT
Insurance is ordinarily marketed through intermediaries.
These intermediaries often play an active role in the applica-
tion, distribution, and claims-adjusting phases of the insurance
process. The terms "agent" and "broker" have become the words
commonly used by the public when describing insurance compa-
59. See supra note 42.
60. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. v. Federal Natl Bank, 151 F.2d 537 (10th Cir.
1945); Pittman v. Maxwell, 332 S.E.2d 683 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
61. See New York Life Ins. v. Federal Natl Bank, 151 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1945);
cf. Strubbe v. Sonnenschein, 299 F.2d 185 (2nd Cir. 1962). See also CRAWFORD &
BEADLES, supra note 25, at 361-65.
62. See supra note 61.
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ny intermediaries. However, the words "agent" and "broker" are
much too generic and imprecise to characterize the status or
role of all insurance sales representatives. For example, insur-
ance companies market their product through various forms of
intermediaries, including but not limited to: (1) sales represen-
tatives who are employed by the company; (2) subsidiary or
commonly-owned companies; or (3) through separate companies
or persons referred to as independent agents and insurance
brokers. Consequently, the relationship between insurance com-
panies and their intermediaries, and the legal consequence
thereof, has been the subject of much litigation.
The diverse and unique types of insurance intermediaries
have presented courts with the arduous task of distinguishing
between the intermediaries with regards to the duties they owe
to consumers and insurance companies, respectively. Courts
frequently turn to agency law in search of appropriate rules of
dispute resolution.63 "Agency" is "the fiduciary relation which
results from manifestation of consent by one person to another
that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control,
and consent by the other so to act."" Liability under agency
law often depends upon the classification of the intermediary
involved in the dispute (e.g., general agent or special agent)"
63. This approach has been the subject of severe criticism.
The relationships between insurance companies and sales representatives
in regard to the authority to contract on behalf of insurers have been
established in a multitude of patterns that often cannot be accurately de-
scribed or characterized by the terms that are generally used to define
relationships in agency law. Thus, a fundamental error can result in
some instances when a concept from agency law is applied to a disputed
insurance transaction as if it were a universally applicable proposition. In
general, considerable skepticism should be applied to any assertion that a
particular result in an insurance dispute is warranted by the law that
governs agency relationships.
KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 9, § 2.5(b).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958).
65. "A general agent is an agent authorized to conduct a series of transactions
involving a continuity of service." Id. § 3(1).
"A special agent is an agent authorized to conduct a single transaction or a
series of transactions not involving continuity of service." Id. § 3(2).
The test for determining the type of agent is continuity of the agent's service
and not the breadth or extent of his power. Continuity of service is concerned with
limitations either in time, purpose, or nature of the agency, which would reasonably
require the agent to get fresh authority before he acts or continues to act on behalf
of the purported principal.
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and the extent of its authority to represent one or the other of
the parties to the transaction.' "Definitional precision pro-
motes understanding and communication, but does not neces-
sarily assure predictability."'7 Therefore, the term "insurance
agent" is often too broad to accurately describe the relationship
that exists between intermediaries and insurance companies.'c
Consequently, titles such as "general," "special," and "soliciting"
66. An agent can bind its principal contractually only to the extent that the
agent is authorized to enter into the transaction. "Authority is the power of the agent
to affect the legal relations of the principal by acts done in accordance with the
principal's manifestations of consent to him." Id. § 7. This provision contemplates that
a principal can bestow actual authority upon the agent. Actual authority can be ei-
ther expressed or implied. Implied actual authority can be incidental to or inferred
from the circumstances; however, it cannot be inconsistent with the authority express-
ly granted.
The concept of apparent authority is also relied upon by courts to impose liabil-
ity upon principals for contractual obligations created by agents. "Apparent authority
is the power to affect the legal relations of another person by transactions with third
persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising from and in accordance with the
other's manifestations to such third person." Id. § 8. Apparent authority results from
a manifestation being made to the third person and not, as when actual authority is
being created, to the agent. See id. § 8, cmt. (a). "[Aipparent authority exists only
with regards to those who believe and have reason to believe that there is authori-
ty .... " Id.
Estoppel also operates as a form of authority. See id. § 8(B). Estoppel is fun-
damentally an equitable concept that operates by preventing the party against whom
it operates from pleading the truth. The elements of estoppel are that: (1) a culpable
act of commission or omission by the principal create the appearance of authority in
the agent; (2) the third party acts in good faith and with reasonable prudence in
reliance upon such appearance of authority; and (3) the third party changes its posi-
tion to its detriment in reliance upon such appearance of authority. See id.
Inherent agency power is treated as a form of authority. This term indicates
"the power of an agent which is not derived from authority, apparent authority or
estoppel, but solely from the agency relation and exists for the protection of third
persons harmed by or dealing with [an] agent." Id. § 8(A).
Ratification, which is not a form of authority, has the same effect as autho-
rization. "Ratification is the affirmance by a person of a prior act which did not bind
him but which was done or professedly done on his account, whereby the act, as to
some or all persons, is given effect as if originally authorized by him." Id. § 82.
67. HARRY G. HENN, TEACHING MATERIALS ON AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP AND
OTHER UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 3 (2d ed. 1985).
68. An insurance agent is almost uniformly defined as one who has a
fixed and permanent relationship with an insurance company which
the agent represents. The agent has certain duties and allegiances
to that company. An insurance agent is generally called into action,
paid by, and controlled by a particular insurance company.
Frank X. Neuner, Jr. & Robert E. Torian, Basics of Insurance Agents' and Brokers'
Liability, A.BA. TORT & INS. PRAC. SEC. 11.
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agent are often employed to describe intermediaries involved in
the marketing of life insurance. These labels describe the vari-
ous types of legal relationships that exist between intermediar-
ies, insureds, and insurers. Thus, in many instances the label
attached to the intermediary determines the outcome of the
dispute.
A. General Agent and Soliciting Agent Defined
The distinction between a general agent and soliciting agent
is often significant in determining the fiduciary obligations
owed to an insured. A general agent is ordinarily an individual
engaged in the business of representing a specific insurance
company within territorial limits identified by the company.69
General agents are often compensated by way of commission on
the amount of insurance marketed.70 A general agent is autho-
rized to: (1) accept risks; (2) agree upon and settle terms of
insurance contracts; (3) issue policies; and (4) renew policies
already issued.7' They are, for all practical purposes, the agent
of the company they represent.72
A soliciting agent, in contrast, is merely an individual hired
to sell insurance, receive applications and forward them to the
company or its general agent.7" A soliciting agent may also be
authorized to perform other ministerial functions such as deliv-
69. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 9, at 81; see also Lazzara v. Howard A.
Esser, Inc., 802 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1986).
70. See supra note 69.
71. See Dodds v. Hanover Ins., 880 S.W.2d 311 (Ark. 1994); Resnick v. Wolf &
Cohen, Inc., 49 A.2d 809 (D.C. 1946).
72. See Wolfer v. Mutual Life Ins., 641 P.2d 1349, 1357 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982)
(Kanbora, J., dissenting)' (citing 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 146 (1982)). Though
ordinarily viewed as the agent of the company, "lilt has been noted that 'because of
the increasing complexity of the insurance industry and the specialized knowledge
required to understand all of its intricacies, the relationship between the insurance
agent and a client is often a fiduciary one.' Winter v. Nationwide Mut: Ins., No.
0049205, 1990 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 331, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 23, 1990)
(quoting Katz v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 3 CSCR 25 (1987)).
This view seems to be applicable only where the agent holds himself out as a
consultant and counselor and is acting as a specialist. See 16 JOHN A. APPLEMAN &
JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 8836, at 64-66 (1981).
73. See supra note 71. See also Washington Natl Ins. v. Employment Sec.
Comm'n, 144 P.2d 688 (Ariz. 1944) (holding that a solicitor is one employed by an
insurance agent and therefore is a mere middleman).
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ering policies and collecting premiums. 4 However, unlike gen-
eral agents, soliciting agents lack authority to agree upon,
change, or waive the agreed-upon terms of policies. 5 Soliciting
agents are primarily responsible for inducing third parties to
apply for insurance. 6 They are in essence a species of special
agents with limited power to bind their principles.
B. Insurance Broker Defined
An insurance broker procures insurance and acts as a mid-
dleman between the insured and insurer.7 Brokers solicit in-
surance from the public under no employment from any par-
ticular company. 9 Instead, when a request to procure insur-
ance is secured, brokers either place the order with a company
selected by the applicant, or in the absence of a selection by the
applicant, with a company of the broker's choice.80 Brokers are
generally treated as the agent of their employer.81
The distinction between an insurance agent and broker does
not depend upon the title or license; rather it is a question to
be determined from the facts of the particular case.82 Many
courts attempt to resolve this issue by applying basic agency
principles pursuant to which the authority of the individual is
examined. If the insurer's conduct creates either actual or ap-
parent authority for a broker to act on its behalf, the broker
becomes the agent of the insurer." Illinois has formulated a
74. See supra note 71.
75. See supra note 71.
76. See, e.g., Dixie Life & Accident Ins. v. Hmmn, 344 S.W.2d 601 (Ark. 1961); 43
ALI. JUR. 2D Insurance § 123 (1994).
77. See, e.g., Dixie Life & Accident Ins. v. Harm, 344 S.W.2d 601 (Ark. 1961);
Standard Life & Accident Ins. v. Cornelius, 340 P.2d 478 (Okla. 1959); Harrison v.
Travelers Ins., 442 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App. 1969).
78. See American Ins. v. Sederes, 807 F.2d 1402 (7th Cir. 1986); Lazzara v.
Howard A. Esser, Inc., 802 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1986); Washington Natl Ins. v. Em-
ployment Sec. Conm'n, 144 P.2d 688 (Ariz. 1944).
79. See Washington Nat'l Ins. v. Employment See. Conn'n, 144 P.2d 688 (Ariz.
1944).
80. See id.
81. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Booker, 657 F. Supp. 280 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
82. See Lazzara v. Howard A. Esser, Inc., 802 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1986); Curran v.
Industrial Comm'n, 752 P.2d 523 (Ariz. App. 1988).
83. See APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 72, § 8731, at 369-70 (1981); 3 LEE
R. Russ, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 25:95, at 450 (Rev. ed. 1984).
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four-part test for determining whether an individual is an agent
or broker." The relevant criteria under this test are: "(1) who
called the intermediary into action; (2) who controls its action;
(3) who pays it; and (4) whose interest does it represent." '
C. Statutory Definitions
A significant number of states have enacted statutes that
define and distinguish between agents and brokers. 6 For the
most part these statutes merely continue the common-law defi-
nitions and distinctions. For example, in some states, statutes
provide that any person who solicits an application for insur-
ance upon the life of another shall, in any controversy between
the insured or his beneficiary, where the insurer issues any
policy upon such application, be regarded as the agent of the
insurer and not the agent of the insured." In contrast, bro-
kers, in the absence of some manifestation from the insurance
company, are statutorily viewed as the agent of the insured."
Despite the existence of statutes, courts rarely refer to them in
resolving whether a particular intermediary is an agent or
84. See Lazzara v. Howard A. Esser, Inc., 802 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1986).
85. Id. at 264.
86. See ALA. CODE § 27-8-1 (1986); ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-282 (West 1990 &
Supp. 1996); AR.- CODE ANN. § 23-64-102(1), (4) (Michie 1994); CAL. INS. CODE § 32
(West 1993 & Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1702-1703 (1989); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 626.051(1) (West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-23-1 (1996); IDAHO CODE §§ 41-
1021, 41-1023(1) (1991 & Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-15.5-2 (Michie 1994 &
Supp. 1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.9-030(2) (Michie 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24-A, § 1504 (West 1990); MIss. CODE ANN. § 83-17-101 (1992 & Supp. 1996);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 683A-050 (Michie 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 408:5
(1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:22A-2(f) (West 1994); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2101(a), (c)
(Consol. 1985 & Supp. 1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3905.01(1) (Banks-Baldwin
1989 & Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-6-132(4) (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-
1800 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.17.010 (West 1984 &
Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE § 33-1-12 (1996).
87. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-282 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 18, § 1702(c) (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-4004 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 408:7 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-18-24 (Michie 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
58-33-20 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-26-06 to -07 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3923.141 (Banks-Baldwin 1996); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 1423 (1990 & Supp. 1997); OR.
REV. STAT. § 774.165 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-43-10 (Law Co-op. 1995); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWs § 58-15-47 (Michie 1996); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 13.04, 21.02
(West 1981 & Supp. 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4792 (1993); VA. CODE ANN §
38.2-1801 (Michie 1994); W. VA. CODE § 33-12-23 (1996).
88. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-26-07 (1995).
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broker." Instead, courts continue to rely upon the traditional
agency law approach in determining how an insurance interme-
diary should be classified.9"
D. Dual Agency
Ordinarily an individual is the agent of only one or the other
of the parties in any single transaction. This proposition is
founded upon the principle that an agent cannot serve two
masters. In the context of insurance law, however, courts recog-
nize a limited exception to this rule. This exception is common-
ly referred to as the dual agency principle.
The dual agency principle recognizes that insurance agents
and brokers can, under appropriate circumstances, be the agent
of both the insurer and insured in the same transaction.9' For
example, it has been held that the agent may act for both the
insurer and insured in collecting premiums, delivering the poli-
cy, and procuring insurance.92 Application of the principle of
dual agency, however, is limited to circumstances where the
agent's or broker's performance of the obligations in the partic-
ular transaction are not inconsistent.9" Thus, the principle is
inapplicable to situations where the interests of the insured and
insurer are incompatible or conflict.94
89. See, e.g., Boyter v. Blazer Constr. Co., 505 So.2d 854 (La. App. 1987). But see
Celtic Life Ins. v. Coats, 885 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. 1994).
90. See, e.g., Lien Ho Hsing Steel Enter. Co. v. Weihtag, 738 F.2d 1455 (9th Cir.
1984).
91. See Allstate Auto Leasing Co. v. Caldwell, 394 A.2d 748 (Del. Super. Ct.
1978); American Fire Ins. v. King Lumber & Mfg., 77 So. 168 (Fla. 1917); Byrne v.
Reardon, 397 S.E.2d 22 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); Illinois Sec. Ins. v. Burgos, 583 N.E.2d
547 (II. 1991).
92. See Fraser-Yamor Agency v. County of Del Norte, 137 Cal. Rptr. 118 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1977); Anfinsen Plastic Molding Co. v. Konen, 386 N.E.2d 108 (I1. App. Ct.
1979); Hunt v. Texas, 737 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. App.. 1987).
93. See Johnson v. North British & Merchants Ins., 63 N.E. 610 (Ohio 1902).
94. See id.; see also Merbitz v. Great Nat'l Life Ins., 599 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. App.
1980).
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E. Fiduciary Obligation
All agents are fiduciaries of their principals. The fiduciary
relationship imposes upon an agent the highest obligation of
loyalty, good faith, and fair dealing. As a matter of policy, fidu-
ciaries are precluded from taking advantage of their principals.
As integrated into the primary thesis, the legal contention from
the perspective of the insured or beneficiary is that an agent
who takes an absolute assignment of his client's life policy has
breached his fiduciary obligation of loyalty and trust. From the
perspective of the general agency law approach, the question of
to whom the fiduciary obligation is owed turns upon the classi-
fication of the actor as agent or broker. Consequently, the
strengths and weaknesses of the argument that the insurance
intermediary has breached the fiduciary duty to the client will
depend upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case.
The breach of fiduciary obligation argument can be asserted
from a perspective other than agency law. Courts have long
recognized that under appropriate circumstances, fiduciary du-
ties can arise from contract or the reposing of trust." Thus,
[a] fiduciary relationship may arise in a legal, moral, do-
mestic, or personal context, where there appears "on the
one side an overmastering influence or, on the other, weak-
ness, dependence, or trust, justifiably reposed." Additionally,
a confidential relationship, which imposes a duty similar to
a fiduciary relationship, may arise when one party justifi-
ably imposes special trust and confidence in another, so
that the first party relaxes the care and vigilance that he
would normally exercise in entering into a transaction with
a stranger.'
The relationship which arises out of contract or reposing of
trust is often referred to as quasi-fiduciary."7 In the eyes of
the law this relationship imposes upon the agent obligations
and responsibilities identical to a true fiduciary relationship.
95. See Mark Budnitz, The Sale of Credit Life Insurance: The Bank As Fiduciary,
62 N.C. L. REV. 295 (1984).





The term "quasi" serves to underscore the fact that courts are
reluctant to recognize non-traditional fiduciary relationships
and have opted instead to expand fiduciary relationships only
where the circumstances of the specific case so demands.
Judicial recognition of a fiduciary relationship premised upon
the existence of a confidential relationship is not uncommon.
Courts have not, however, articulated a hard and fast definition
of confidential relationship, and have not listed those circum-
stances which give rise to such a relationship.98 This is, in all
probability, due to the fact that the majority of quasi-fiduciary
relationships are recognized by courts of equity for the purpose
of achieving justice or fairness.' Nevertheless, it has been ob-
served that "a confidential relationship exists between two per-
sons when one has gained the confidence of the other and pur-
ports to act or advise with the other's interest in mind.""°
Thus, a confidential relationship is ordinarily recognized where,
"by reason of kinship, business association, disparity in age, etc.
the transferee is in an especially close relationship to the trans-
feror, and the latter reposes a high degree of trust and confi-
dence in the former."'' It does not necessarily follow that all
or even most informal relationships that involve one or a com-
bination of the previously stated circumstances will be viewed
as a fiduciary one. Rather, it has been invariably observed that
a fiduciary relationship results from an informal relationship
"only when both parties understand that a special trust or
confidence has been reposed."'
Whether a confidential relationship exists is a question of
98. See, e.g., Dunham v. Dunham, 528 A.2d 1123 (Conn. 1987).
Rather than attempt to define "a fiduciary relationship in precise detail
and in such a manner to exclude new situations," we have instead cho-
sen to leave "the bars down for situations in which there is a justifiable
trust confided on one side and a resulting superiority and influence on
the other."
Id. at 1133 (citation omitted).
99. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION §§ 1-10 (1937); see also HENRY
L. McCLINTOcK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 29 (2d ed. 1948).
100. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF REsTuTON § 166, cmt. d (1937).
101. Klein v. Shaw, 706 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985).
102. Nichols v. Chicago Title Ins., 669 N.E.2d 323, 333 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); see
also Craggett v. Adell Ins., 635 N.E.2d 1326 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (noting that a
confidential relationship cannot be unilateral-both parties must understand that a
special trust or confidence has been reposed).
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fact.' °3 Upon proof thereof, however, a fiduciary relationship is
presumed and the burden of proof shifts to the fiduciary to
prove fair dealing.' The standard of proof for fair dealing re-
quires proof either by clear and convincing evidence or some
other standard greater than a preponderance of the evi-
dence."5
Breach of the confidential relationship is quite frequently
treated as constructive fraud.' The corresponding remedy for
the breach is a constructive trust in which the transferee, if the
acquisition was in violation of his fiduciary duty, holds the
property for the benefit of the transferor.' 7 The confidential
relationship theory also eliminates the requirement that actual
fraud be proven as an inducement for the transfer.'8
103. See Dunham v. Dunham, 528 A.2d 1123 (Conn. 1987).
104. See, e.g., Hicks v. Clayton, 136 Cal. Rptr. 512, 519-20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977);
Dunham v. Dunham, 528 A.2d 1123, 1134 (Conn. 1978); Nelson v. Walden, 186 So.2d
517, 519 (Fla. App. 1966); In re Miller, 568 S.W.2d 246, 251 (Mo. 1978).
105. See supra note 104.
106. See, e.g., Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1988); Honolulu Fed.
Say. & Loan v. Murphy, 753 P.2d 807 (Haw. Ct. App. 1988); Fix v. Fix, 847 S.W.2d
762 (Mo. 1993); Sutton v. Sander, 195 N.E.2d 303 (N.Y. App. 1963); Brisson v. Wil-
liams, 345 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986); Asleson v. West Branch Land Co., 311
N.W.2d 533 (N.D. 1981); Hatton v. Turner, 622 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. App. 1981); see also
89 C.J.S. Trusts § 151, at 1051, 1061 (1995).
Constructive fraud is variously defined as fraud which arises by operation of
the law from a course of conduct which, if sanctioned by law, would secure an uncon-
scionable, unjust, or inequitable advantage, without regard to the existence or evi-
dence of actual fraud. See, e.g., Brazee v. Morris, 204 P.2d 475 (Ariz. 1949); Morris v.
Valley Forge Ins., 805 S.W.2d 948 (Ark. 1991); McDaniel v. Sheperd, 577 N.E.2d 239
(Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Whiteco Properties, Inc. v. Thielbar, 467 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984); Faulkenberry v. Kansas City S.R.R., 602 P.2d 203 (Okla 1979).
107. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 190 (1937).
108. See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 471 (Rev. 2d ed. 1978).
Occasionally a court has indicated that fraud constitutes an essen-
tial element, but where a fiduciary or confidential relationship is found
fraud in the transaction is presumed.
It has sometimes been stated that "fraud" is at the bottom of every
constructive trust. "Fraud" is, of course, a very ambiguous word. It may
mean misrepresentation which would give ground for an action of deceit.
It may imply the acquisition of property by some other type of wrongdo-
ing or by any type of inequitable conduct. Certainly it is not true that
all constructive trusts are based on "fraud," unless that word is used in
its broadest sense to include all conduct which equity treats as unfair,
unconscionable and unjust.
Id. at 21-23. See also McDaniel v. Shepherd, 577 N.E.2d 239, 242 (Ind. Ct. App.
1991).
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The major disadvantage of the breach of fiduciary duty argu-
ment is that it limits the complaining party's recourse to an
action against the agent. The essence of the argument is that
the insurance agent is accountable to the insured for any bene-
fits received as a result of his breach of fiduciary duty. Thus,
the insurance company, in the absence of a simultaneous
breach of fiduciary duty, is not the primary target of liability.
This argument can be further complicated by the existence of
an agreement-between-parties contract.
An agreement of this nature, carefully and thoroughly draft-
ed, details not only the terms of the assignment but the circum-
stances and conditions that gave rise to the transaction. The
environment from which an agreement-between-parties contract
arises can be as opprobrious as the absolute assignment trans-
action itself. This environment is often characterized by agents
who foresee the possibility of litigation and go to every extreme
to protect their legal position in the event this contingency
becomes a reality. The insured, often motivated by financial
exigency, uninformed and/or misinformed and desirious of a
quick resolution of the transaction, is willing to sign anything
to get his hands on cash. Thus, it does not require a stretch of
the imagination to understand that the contract tends to in-
clude those details and facts that support the legal position of
its drafter-the assignee/agent.
An agreement-between-parties contract can present evidentia-
ry dilemmas for the representatives of deceased insureds chal-
lenging the validity of assignments to insurance agents who
lack insurable interests in the lives insured. This agreement is
a testament of the terms, conditions, and circumstances under
which the insured, who is dead and unable to testify, agreed to
the assignment. Consequently, the contract between the parties
may be the most credible evidence of fair dealing. The contract,
if unambiguous and complete, may also be subject to the parole
evidence rule."°
109. The parole evidence rule precludes the admission of extrinsic evidence of a
prior or contemporaneous agreement that contradicts the terms of a complete and
unambiguous written contract. The written contract supersedes all previous under-
standings and the intent of the parties must be ascertained from the written agree-
ment itself. See Valley Bank v. Christensen, 808 P.2d 415, 417 (Idaho 1991). The
agreement may not be controverted by speculation or after-the-fact testimony. See
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IV. BAD FAITH
Inevitably, a challenge to the validity of an absolute assign-
ment to an insurance agent lacking an insurable interest in the
life insured will include an allegation of bad faith against both
the agent and insurance company."0 It is this charge that
most intimidates and concerns insurers. The intimidation factor,
inherent in every allegation of bad faith, results from the extra-
contractual nature of this claim. The bad faith claim is an
assertion that the insurer breached its implied duty of fair
dealing and good faith which arises out of the insurance
contract."' Pursuant to this duty, the insurer is obligated to
exercise reasonable prudence in the claims process. The breach
of this implied obligation, by unreasonable denial or delay in
Wilson v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins., 920 F.2d 1548 (10th Cir. 1990). Courts
uniformly recognize that the parol evidence rule is only applicable to those circum-
stances in which the contract is untainted by fraud, mistake, accident, or erroneous
admission. See United Pac. Ins. v. Northwestern Natl Ins., 185 F.2d 443, 446 (1950).
110. A complete and thorough discussion of bad faith is beyond the scope of this
article. For a detailed and comprehensive treatment of the subject, see WILLIAM M.
SHERNOFF, ET AL., INSURANCE BAD FAmI LITIGATION (1996).
111. Compare Anderson v. Continental Ins., 271 N.W.2d 368, 375-77 (Wis. 1978),
with Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins., 510 P.2d 1032, 1037-40 (Cal. 1973). In the context of
first-party insurance, the two cited decisions are given credit for establishing the two
dominant standards for determining bad faith. The majority of jurisdictions are said
to follow the view articulated in the Anderson decision. See PAUL J. SKOK, TRIAL
ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO INSURANCE COVERAGE AND BAD FArTH §§ 7.14-7.15 (1994) (cit-
ing Gruenberg as the minority view).
In Anderson, the Wisconsin Supreme Court identified the contours of bad faith
as follows: "[t]o show a claim of bad faith, a plaintiff must show the absence of a
reasonable basis for denying benefits of the policy and the defendant's knowledge or
reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim." 271
N.W.2d at 376. This standard focuses on the intentional nature of the insurer's con-
duct and requires at least some conscious awareness of the lack of a reasonable basis
for the denial of the claim. Conscious awareness however, "may be inferred and im-
puted to an insurance company where there is a reckless disregard of a lack of a
reasonable basis for denial or a reckless indifference to facts or to proofs submitted
by the insured." Id. at 377.
The Anderson standard is more stringent than that articulated by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Gruenberg. The Gruenberg standard revolves around the rea-
sonableness of the insurer's denial of the claim. This fact-intensive standard is an-
swered on the basis of how a reasonable insurer would have acted under the circum-
stances and facts of the case. This standard does not require the insured to prove
that its insurer's conduct was the result of bad motive, subjective intent to cause
harm, or conscious awareness that its conduct was unjustified, in order to prove bad
faith for purposes of recovering compensatory damages. See Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at
1037-40.
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paying a claim, constitutes a tort in nearly every jurisdic-
tion."
Ordinarily an agent of the insurer or any third party who is
a stranger to the contract may not be held liable for bad faith
conduct." The absence of a contractual relationship between
the agent and insured nullifies the existence of a fiduciary
relationship upon which bad faith is premised." Neverthe-
less, the agent's conduct may be relevant in determining wheth-
er the insurer has breached its duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing. At least one federal court has recognized an exception to
the general prohibition against asserting bad faith against
agents. This exception is applied when a special relation-
ship exists between the agent and insured, and such relation-
ship arises out of the contractual obligations of the agent to the
insurance company."6 Although the special relationship need-
ed to trigger application of the exception does not ordinarily ex-
ist between individual agents and insurers, it is not uncommon
where the insurer employs another insurance company or insti-
tution as the primary administrator of the insurance plan."1
Such an administrator, empowered to perform significant func-
tions ordinarily reserved to insurance companies and possessing
a pecuniary interest tied to the risks insured, may be treated
as the insurer."
Assuming arguendo that the complaining party has standing
to assert bad faith, the merits of such a claim, in the con-
112. See WILLIAM S. SHERNOFF, ET AL., INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION, § 1.01,
at 1-2 n.3 (1994).
113. See Griffin v. Ware, 457 So. 2d 936, 940-41 (Miss. 1984); Allstate Ins. v.
Amick, 680 P.2d 362, 364-65 (Okla. 1984) (citing Christion v. American Home Assur.
Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978)).
114. See Amick, 680 P.2d at 364-65; Griffin, 457 So. 2d at 94041.
115. See Wolf v. Prudential Ins., 50 F.3d 793 (10th Cir. 1995).
116. See id.; Leuck v. Aetna Life Ins., 342 N.W.2d 699 (Wis. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Leuck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
117. See id.
118. See Amick, 680 P.2d at 364-65; Griffin, 457 So. 2d at 940-41.
119. An insurer's liability for bad faith does not extend to every individual entitled
to the insurance proceeds. Rather, the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
extends only to those persons sharing a contractual or statutory relationship with the
insurer. Only individuals in these classes have standing to sue for bad faith. See, e.g.,
Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973); Allstate Ins. v. Amick, 680 P.2d
362 (Okla. 1984); Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 307 N.W.2d 256 (Wis.
1981).
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text of an assignment transaction, is at best tenuous. This
conclusion stems from the fact that courts have not extended
the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing beyond the
claims process." Upon receiving notice of inconsistent
claims, insurance companies, encouraged by the fear of having
to pay twice and the existence of extra-contractual remedies
such as bad faith, uniformly seek to implead the proceeds of
the policy into the registry of a court of competent jurisdic-
tion." Stakeholders are not required by law to wait until
claims have been actually made before seeking interpleader.
Once aware that conflicting claims may be made, stakeholders
such as insurance companies, upon receiving notice of the death
of the insured, can seek to implead the proceeds into the regis-
try of the court, rather than await receipt of the competing
claims. The act of impleading the proceeds prior to a claim
being made is a tactical maneuver aimed at diffusing subse-
quently filed extra-contractual actions.
Interpleader is analogous to an admission that the proceeds
are the subject of conflicting claims and within the possession
of the insurer, who is merely holding the funds and not claim-
ing an interest therein.' Interpleader imposes upon the court
the burden of determining, as between the competing claimants,
to whom the proceeds should be paid.m It should be noted
that interpleader does not automatically operate as a safe har-
bor. In order to receive a discharge from liability as a result of
impleading the proceeds, the insurer must be free from blame
in causing the controversy.' Discharge is only a certainty
where the insurer, upon becoming aware of the inconsistent
claims, immediately impleads the proceeds without embroiling
itself in the merits of the assignment or claims. The more time
that elapses between notice and initiation of the interpleader
120. See Watkins v. Life Ins. Co. of Georgia, 456 So. 2d 259 (Ala. 1984). Cf. Spin-
dle v. Travelers Ins. Co., 136 Cal. Rptr. 404 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (action for bad faith
is not limited solely to claims process but may arise out of breach of any provision of
the insurance contract).
121. See CRAWFORD & BEADLEs, supra note 25, at 399-402.
122. In order to seek interpleader, the stakeholder must acknowledge his own lack
of interest in the proceeds and that the stake is within his control and capable of
being delivered to the registry of the court. See 48 C.J.S. Interpleader § 2 (1981).
123. See CRAWFORD & BEADLEs, supra note 25.




action, the greater the likelihood that culpable conduct of the
type that will defeat a prayer for discharge will occur.
V. CONCLUSION
The frequency with which these types of assignments occur is
difficult, if not impossible, to predict. Furthermore, research
reveals no reported judicial opinions in which this specific issue
has been discussed. Likewise, the current state of the law,
other than in Oklahoma and Florida, provides little in the way
of a definitive response. These considerations, however, should
not be interpreted by the insurance industry as factors counsel-
ing in favor of inaction. Rather, they must be balanced against
the quasi-public nature of the insurance industry' and soci-
etal obligations that inure therefrom.
The quasi-public nature of the marketing of insurance justi-
fies the extensive judicial and legislative scrutiny applied to the
industry. The focus of this scrutiny, for the most part, has been
concentrated on transactions in which institutional interests
conflict with societal interests. The tension between institution-
al and societal interests has led to a wave of litigation in which
courts as well as legislatures have declared that the public
interest outweighs the industry's interest in maximizing profits
and gains.26 This policy declaration is characterized by its ex-
pansive nature, which makes it a convenient tool for judicial
lawmaking.'27
125. See LEE . Russ & THOMNAs F. SEGOLLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 22 (3d ed.
1995); 19 JOHN A. APPLEhIAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §
10321 (1982); Matthew 0. Trobriner & Joseph P. Grodin, The Individual and the
Public Service Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1249
(1967). The public nature of the insurance industry is best described in this quote:
"The insurers' obligations are ... rooted in their status as purveyors of a vital ser-
vice labeled quasi-public in nature. Suppliers of services affected with a public inter-
est must take the public's interest seriously, where necessary placing it before their
interest in maximizing gains and limiting disbursements." Egan v. Mutual of Omaha
Ins., 620 P.2d 141, 146 (Cal. 1979) (quoting William M. Goodman & Thom Greenfield.
Seaton, Foreword. Ripe For Decision, Internal Workings and Current Concerns of the
California Supreme Court, 62 CAL. L. REV. 309, 346-347 (1974)).
126. See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins., 620 P.2d 141, 146 (Cal. 1979).
127. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
3, at 15 (5th ed. 1984).
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Most of our refined modern understanding of legal principles
and theories has evolved out of policy declarations. This is
especially true of tort law, the discipline in which public policy
has had its most profound impact.'
The judicial development of insurance law has also been
significantly influenced by perceptions about the interests of
society in the resolution of private disputes.' Judicial percep-
tion of societal interests in both areas-tort and insurance
law-has altered the playing field once governed exclusively by
the insurance contract.'
The relevant question, from a pure policy perspective, is not
whether an absolute assignment to an insurance agent who
lacks an insurable interest in the life insured is per se illegal,
but whether it is right. Factors to be considered in resolving
this question include: (1) the recognized need for compensation;
(2) the moral aspect of defendant's conduct; (3) the convenience
of judicial administration; and (4) the need to prevent future
harm. 3' Also to be considered is the existence of a feasible
alternative for eliminating the risk of injury.
The insurance industry has before it two courses of action:
(1) await further litigation, which is all but inevitable; or (2)
exercise initiative. Policy considerations counsel strongly in
favor of the latter. Initiatives can take either of two forms: (1)
develop policy and mandatory procedures to be followed in as-
signments of this nature; or (2) in the absence of an insurable
interest, declare all absolute assiknments to agents void. At the
risk of sounding cavalier, the first initiative suffers from obvi-
ous shortcomings. For example, the development of procedures
128. See id.
129. See KEETON & WIDiss, supra note 9, § 6.4(a), at 646.
130. The advance of torts principles into the traditional realm of con-
tract law is most dramatic in the field of insurance law. The insur-
ance policy has long been viewed as the ultimate contract, entitled
to the utmost respect, if not admiration. Carefully drafted by law-
yers knowledgeable in insurance law, honed to perfection by years
of stare decisis, with almost every paragraph regulated by statute,
one can understand the shock the insurance industry must experi-
ence as it views its castle walls crumbling, clause by clause.
John C. McCarthy, Plaintiffs View of Fire Cases, in EXTRACONTRAcTUAL DAMAGES 71,
72 (John R. Groves ed., 1983).
131. For a detailed discussion of these factors, see KEETON ET AL., supra note 126.
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for the handling of such transactions may constitute an under-
taking or holding out on the part of the institution, which gives
rise to a duty of care in the implementation and oversight
phases of assignments. As noted earlier, most life insurance
policies contain disclaimers of responsibility for determining the
validity of an assignment provision."' The development of a
contrary policy could lead to the erosion of the law, which cur-
rently favors the insurer. This initiative is not cost efficient, in
that it requires the development of procedures, additional train-
ing of agents, and monitoring of all assignments, while not
necessarily eliminating the likelihood of litigation.' The bet-
ter initiative is clearly the second alternative. It is cost efficient
and eliminates the likelihood of litigation.
Declaring all absolute assignments to agents void, unlike the
development of policy and procedures, strengthens rather than
undermines the notion that the insurance industry is a profes-
sion. Professional responsibility obligates the industry to adopt
standards that reflect its interest in the development and ac-
ceptance of moral and social modes of behavior. Moral responsi-
bility is primarily concerned with the right or wrong of industry
practice or policy. Resolution of the issue turns not upon the
benefits of the practice or policy to the industry, but upon its
potential for harm to society. Moral responsibility is distin-
guishable from social responsibility in that the latter is primari-
ly concerned with direct and measurable contributions to soci-
ety. Such contributions can take the form of donations to, or
sponsorship of, civic activities.
An agent's act of taking an assignment of a client's policy
has an obviously deleterious effect on public perceptions of the
insurance industry. It provides an opportunity for self-dealing
and creates a negative impression of agents. Because these
transactions provide no positive benefits to the insured or the
insurers, it behooves one to understand why such assignments
are not prohibited by the insurance industry.
132. See supra Part H.C.
133. More policy, like more laws, does not guarantee fewer law suits. Quite often
new policies and procedures will serve as the basis of the suit. For example, where
the policy or procedure has not been followed to the letter by the institution, supervi-
sor, or agent, it will be raised as evidence of breach of contract or obligation of care.
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